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OPTIMAL ENVIRONMENTAL TAXATION
IN THE PRESENCE OF OTHER TAXES:
GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSES
ABSTRACT
This paper examines the optimal setting of environmental taxes in economies where other,
distortionary taxes are present We employ analytical and numerical models to explore the
degree to which, in a second best economy, optimal environmental tax rates differ from the rates
implied by the Pigovian principle (according to which the optimal tax rate equals the marginal
environmental damages). Both models indicate, contrary to what several analysts have suggested,
that the optimal tax rate on emissions of a given pollutant is generally lessthanthe rate
supported by the Pigovian principle. Moreover, the optimal rate is lowerthelarger are the
distortions posed by ordinary taxes. Numerical results indicate that previous studies may have
seriously overstated the size of the optimal carbon tax by disregarding .pre-existing taxes.
A. Lans Bovenberg Lawrence H. Goulder
Center for Economic Research Department of Economics
Tilburg University Landau Building
P.O. Box 90153 Stanford University
5000 LE Tilburg Stanford. CA 94305-6072
THE NETHERLANDS and NBERI. Introduction
Most economies feature levels of public spending that require more tax revenues than would be
generated solely from pollution taxes set according to the Pigovian principle, that is, set equal to marginal
environmental damages. As a consequence. tax systems generally rely on both environmental (corrective)
and othertaxes. However, the traditionamong economists has been to analyze corrective and distortionary
taxes separately: environmental taxes usually axe examined without taking into account the presence of
other. distortionary taxes.Thisomissionissignificant because the consequences of environmental taxes
depend fundamentally on the levels of other taxes, including income and commodity taxes.
This paper examines optimal environmental taxation in a second-best setting. In paiticular, we
explore how optimal environmental tax rates deviate from the rates implied by the Pigovian principle.
The few previous investigations of this issue' include Sandmo (1975), Lee and Misiolek (1986) and Oates
(1991).Sandmodemonstraled how the well-known "RamseyTM formula for optimal commodity taxes is
altered when one oftheconsumptioncommoditiesgenerates an externality. Lee-Misiolek and Oaks
deriveformulaeindicatinghowtheoptimalrate for a newly imposed environmental tax isrelatedtothe
marginal excess burden fromexistingtaxes. The present paperextendsthis literature inthreeways.Fiist.
incontrast with Sandmo'swork,it derives analytical expressions for the optimal environmentaltaxina
moregeneral settingthat considersintermediate inputs as well as consumption commodities and
incorporates both public arid private goods in utility. Second. it differsfromthepapersof Lee and
Misiolek and Oaks in applying a general equilibrium analysis to link environmental and other taxes;
distortioriary costs of ordinary and environmental taxes are determined endogenously. Finally, in contrast
with the eatlier papers it combines the analytical work with numerical simulations that consider the
implications of these principles for the U.S. economy.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II analytically investigates optimal environmental taxes
using a simple general equilibrium model. The next two sections explore these issues numerically employ-
ing a disaggregated intertemporal general equilibrium model. Section III describes the numerical model;
Section IV applies this model to evaluate the depaitires from Pigovian lax n.des implied by second-best
considerations. The final section offers conclusions.
1A closely relaled issue is the extent to which die costs of environmental taxes are lowered when revenues from
such taxes are devoted to reductions in existingdistortionarytaxes. A key question is whether "rtcycling the
revenues in thiswaycan make die overall cost of the revenue-neutral policy zeronegative. Fordiscussionsof
this issue in the contextofcarbon taxes, seePoteiba(1993). Oates and Poriney (1992). Pearce (1991). and Stavins
(199!). For nwnei-ical investigations with carbosi taxes see, for example.Weyant (t993)and Goulder (1994).2
H. Theoretical Issues and Analytical Results
This section explores analytically how the presence of distoitionazy taxation affects the optimal
setting of environmental taxes in the context of a simple model. Production is described by a constant-
returns-to-scale production function F(NL,X.Y) with inputs of aggregate labor (the product of the number
of households N, and per capita labor supply, 1.), a 'clean" intermediate good (X). and a "ditty"
intermediate good (Y). Output can be used for public consumption (G), for clean or dirty intermediate
inputs, or for household consumption of a "clean" and "dirty' consumption good (per capita clean and
ditty consumption is denoted by C and D, respectively).Here.commodity market equilibrium is given
by
F(NLX,Y)= G+X+Y-s-NC+ND (1)
Wenormalize units so that the constant rates of transformation between the five produced commodities
are unity.
The representative household maximizes private utility subject to the budget constraint:
(l+t)C +(l+ç,)D = (I—:)wL (2)
where r and ; denote,respectively, the tax rates on clean anddirty consumption.The labor tax rate ti.,
and the producer (before-tax) wage, w, yield the consumption (after-tax) wage, (J-:1)w. Environmental
quality, E, deteriorates with the quantity used of dirty intermediate and dirty consumption goods; that is,
E=e(Y,ND) with e,,e0cO, where subscripts denote partial derivatives. Private decision makers ignore
environmental externalities.
The government budget constraint is:
(3 =:IX+t,Y+:DND+tLwNL (3)
wheret1 and :, stand for the taxes on clean and dirty intermediate inputs, respectively. We assume
(withoutlossof generality2) that the clean consumption commodity is untaxed.
'See footnote 5below.3
To derive the optimal tax rates, we solve the government's problem of maximizinghousehold
utility subject to the government budget constraint and decentralized optimization by firms and households.
Private commodities are separable from public goods in household utility. Acconlingly, the government
adopts its four tax instruments (tL.tQ,1x,tr) to optimize:
NVj(lD)'(l—:1)wJ+NWIfJ.e(Yi'lD)) +p(ILWNL+:0ND+:X"r,fl (4)
whereV represents household indirect utility of private goods, W(G$) is utility from public goods, and
p denotes the marginal disutility of raising one unit of public revenue.
1. Optimal Taxes on Intermediate Goods
Appendix A derives the optimal tax rates. The analysis reveals that the clean intermediate inputs
should not tie taxed (i.e., :=O). Hence, in the absence of environmental externalities, net rather than gross
output should be taxed. This an application of the well-known optimality ofproductionefficiency derived
by Diamond and Mirrlees (1971). 'They demonstrated that. if production exhibits constant returns to
scale', an optimal tax system should not distort production. Intuitively, a tax on intermediate inputs is
borne by the only primaiy factor of production. i.e. labor, and thus amounts to an implicit labor tax. From
a revenue-raising point of view, the implicit labor tax is less efficient than an explicit tax on labor;
whereas both taxes distort labor supply by reducing the consumption wage, only the input tax distorts the
input mix into production.
The optimal tax on dirty inputs amounts to (see equation [A.71 In Appendix A):
uE(—e,) 1 (5)
"Cj1l
In contrast to the tax on clean inputs, the tax on dirty inputs is positive as long as households value
environmental quality (i.e. u>O). The term between square brackets on the tight-hand side of (5)
corresponds to the textbook Pigovian tax. i is defined as the ratio of the marginal value of public revenue
to the marginal utility of private income; it is often referred to as the marginal cost of public funds
(MCPF). TheMCPFterm in (5)revealshow second-best considerations affect optimal environmental
'Under decreasing returns to scale. iwoduction efficiency continues to be optimal as long as a 100% profit tax
is available.4
taxation. Itindicates in particular that the Pigovian tax is optimal only if fl equals unity. Aunitaiy
MCPFmeansthat public funds axe not scaiter than privatefunds(as is the case when lump-sum taxes and
subsidiesare available or when labor supply is completely inelastic). However, in a second-best world
without lump-sum taxation, the MCPF typically differs from one. In panicular the higher is the MCPF,
the lower is the optimal environmental tax. ceterisparibus.
The inverse relationship between the MCPF and the optimal environmental tax may seem
surprising since revenues from the environmental tax can be used to reduce distortionaiy taxes. However,
the cnacial consideration here is bow the presence(asopposed to reduction) of distortionaiy taxes in the
economy influences the costs of environmental taxes. The connection can be understood as follows.
Abstracting from their environmental benefits, environmental taxes are more costly than alternative
distordonaxy taxes. In particular, a tax on dirty intermediate inputs is moxe costly than a lax on net output
(see Diamond and Mirrlees (1971]). This is the case because, in conuast to a tax on net output, the
pollution tax "distorts" the input mix into production. In this way, environmental taxes involve an excess
cost over other distortionary taxes such as labor taxes, and this excess cost rises with the MCPF (see
Bovenberg and de Mooij. 1994). Hence, the higher the MCPF, the higher the environmental benefits need
to be to othet the excess costs of environmental taxes. The optimal pollution tax balances the social
opportunity cost of additional tax revenue against the social benefit from reduced pollution. A higher
MCPF means that the social opportunity cost of revenue is larger; hence the social benefits from pollution
reduction have to be greater to justify a given environmental tax.
Another way of interpreting the negative impact of the MCPF on the optimal environmental tax
is as follows. The government employs the tax system to accomplish simultaneously two objectives:
namely, raising public revenues to finance public goods (other than the environment), and internalizing
pollution externalities (thereby protecting the public good of the natural environment), If public revenues
become scarcer, as indicated by a higher marginal cost of public funds, the optimal tax system focuses
more on generating revenues (through non-environmental taxes, which axe more efficient 1mm a
revenue-raising point of view) and less on internalizing pollution externalities.
High estimates for the marginal efficiency costs of the existing tax system (Ic., the MCPF) have
been used in support of pollution taxes (see. e.g.. Oates (1991). and Pearce (t991)). However, these
arguments ignore the costs of environmental taxes in terms of exacerbating pre-existing tax distortions.
'The word "distort" is in quota to acknowledge the notion that the change in resource allocation may be justified
once environmental benefits are taken into account5
Theseadditional costs of environmental taxes are likely to be especially large if the marginal efficiency
costs of the existing tax system are substantial. Therefore, the higher the efficiency costs of the existing
tax structure are, the higher the environmental benefits need to be inorderto justify the additional costs
of environmental taxes in terms of a less efficient mechanism for financing public spending. High
estimates for the efficiency costs of existing taxes weakenratherthan .urengthen the case for
environmental taxation.
2.Optimal Taxes on Consumption
Theoptimal tax on dirty consumption consists of two parts (see also Sandmo (1975]. Auerbach
(19851.and Bovenberg and van der Ploeg (1994]). The first part, I0correctsfor the environmental
externality (see expression (A.6] in AppendixA):
=NUE(_eo)li (6)
"CJ
Thisterm looks very similar to (5). It amounts to the Pigovian tax divided by the MCPF. The second
part of the optimal tax on polluting consumption, :p0D.:DE,isthe distortionary (or revenue-raising)
component of the tax. Together with the optimal labor tax, the optimal level of this distortionaiy
component is determined on the basis oldie familiar Raznseyfonnulas for raising revenues with the lowest
costs to private incomes (see equations [A.121 and (A.13] In Appendix A). For exampte. if clean and dirty
consumption are weakly separable from leisure and if utility is homothetic. uniform taxation of clean and
dirty goods is optimal from the point of view of raising revenues with the smallest burden on private
incomes. In this case, the optimal tax sflcture involves equal distortionary components of the two taxes
on consumption. (In the case of the clean consumption commodity, the distoitlonary component isthe
only component) Uniform distortionazy taxes on consumption axe equivalent to taxes on labor, thusthe
optimum is characterized by zero distortionary taxation of polluting consumption! In this case, the only
nonzero component of the optimal tax on dirty consumption is the extemality-correcting part (6) (i.e.,
:0=0andt=:L).
Withthis particular utility structure, the MCPF is given by (see Bovenberg and van tier Ploeg
Of course, since unifonn consumption taxes are equivalent to labor taxes, the optimum can also be achieved
through non-ian distortionary taxes on both consumption goods and lower labor taxes.6
[1994]):
1 (7)
The MCPF thus exceeds unity if (1) the uncompensated wage elasticity of labor supply, 9, is positive and
(2) Pigovian taxes do not suffice to finance public consumption so that the distortionary tax on labor, L'
ispositive. These results are consistent with the literature on the MCPF surveyed in Ballard and Fullerton
(1990). For publicspendingthat is separable from consumer's choice on leisure and consumption. this
literature finds that distortionaty labor taxes raise the marginal costs of public spending above unity if the
uncompensated wage elasticity of labor supply is positive. Combining (5),(6) and(7), we find that the
same condition on the uncompensated elasticity determines whether distortionary labor taxes raise the
marginal cost of (the collective good of) environmental protection above its social benefiL This result
depends on the separability assumptions regarding utility. If environmental quality were a close substitute
for private consumption, compensated rather than uncompensated elasticities would govern the effect on
the marginal cost of environmental protection (see Wildasin [1984]).
IlL Basic Features of the Numerical Model
The relatively simple analytical model discussed above abstracts from some important elements
of actual economies. In particular, that model is static and disregards capital mnTkrls. Moreover, it treats
all production as involving constant returns to scale. We consider these issues In the morn complex
numerical applied in this paper. This model has the attraction of capturing more realistically an actual
economy.
This section sketches out the main features of the numerical model. Some details on the model's
structwe and parameters are offered in Appendix B. A more complete description is contained in Goulder
(1992). Cna and Goulder (1992) provide data documentatioit
The model is an intertempora] genera] equilibrium model of the U.S. economy with international
trade. It generates paths of equilibrium prices, outputs, and incomes for the U.S. economy and the "rest
of the world" under specified policy scenarios. All variables are calculated at yearly intervals beginning
in the 1990 benchmark year and usually extending to the year 2070.
The model is unique in combining a fairly realistic treatment of the U.S. tax system, a detailed
representation of energy production and demand, and attention to stationary-source and mobile-source7
emissions of major airpollutants. Itincorporatesquite specific taxinstruments and addresses effects of
taxation along a number of important dimensions; theseincludefirms investment incentives, equity
values,and profits.' and household consumption, saving and labor supply decisions. The specification
ofenergysupplyIncorporatesthe nonrenewable nature of crude petroleum and natural gas and the
transitionsfrom conventional to syntheticfuels.The treatmentofemissionsisbasedon historical
relationshipsbetween emissions and fuels used, processes employed, and levels of output.
A. Industry andConsumerGoodDisaggregation
Themodel divides U.S. production into the 13 industries indicated in Table 1. The energy
industries consist of coal mining, crude petroleum and natural gas extraction, petroleum refining, synthetic
fuels.etecmcutiUties. and gas utilities. The model distinguishes the 17 consumer goods in Table I.
8.Producer Behavior
1. GeneralSpecifications
In each industry,a nested production structure accounts forsubstitutionbetween different fonns
ofenergy as well as between energyandother inputs.Each industryproducesadistinct output (X), which
isa functionoftheinputsof labor (L). capital (K). an energy composite (E) and a materials composite
(M),as well as the currentlevelofinvestment (I):
Xflg(L.K).h(E,MYI — (J/K)'1 (8)
The energycomposite ismadeupof the outputsofthesix eitrgyindustries,whilethe materialscomposite
consists of the outputsof theotherindustries:
E=E(+.i.i,i) (9)
M= M(1,i 1) (10)
wherej is a compOsite ofdomestically producedand threignmadeInput i?Industry indices correspond
to thoseinTable L
Managersofflints choose input quantities and investment levelstomaximize the value of the firm.
The investment decisiontakesaccount ofthe adjustment(or installation) costs represented by (JIK)
./
'Herethe model applies the asset price approach to investment developed in Summen (1981).
'The funcdonsf, g, and h, and the aggregation functions forthe compositesE, 14,and i,are CES and exhibit
constantreturns to scale. Consumer goods are prodixed bycombiningouqxits born the 13industhesin fixed
proportions.8
in equation (8). • is increasing in the rate of investment8
2. Special Featuresofthe Oil-Gas and Synfuels Industries
Theproductionstructure in the oil and gas industry is somewhat more complex than in other
industries to account for the nonrenewable nature of oil and gas stocks. The production specification is:
X='y(Z)fjg(L,K).h(E,M)]
—•(I/K)4 (LI)
wherey is a decreasing function of Z.theamount of cumulative extraction of oil and gas up to the
beginning of the current period. This captures the idea that as Z rises (or, equivalendy. as reserves are
depleted). it becomes increasingly difficult to extract oil and gas resources, so that greater quantitiesof
K, L. E. and Mare required to achieve any given level of extraction (output). Increasing production costs
ultimately induce oil and gas producers to remove their capital from this industry.9
The model incorporates a synthetic fuel -- shale oil -- as a backstop resource, a perfect substitute
for oil and gas!° The technology for producing synthetic fuels on a commercial scale is assumed to
become known in 2010. Thus, capital formation in the synfuels industry cannot begin until that year.
All domestic prices in the model axe endogenous. except forthedomestic price of oil and gas.
The path of oil and gas prices follows the assumptions of the Stanford Energy Modeling Forum." The
supply of imported oil and gas is taken to be perfectly elastic at the world price. So long as imports axe
the marginal source of supply to the domestic economy, domestic produceis of oil and gas receive the
world price (adjusted for tariffs or taxes) for their own output. However, rising oil and gas prices
stimulate investment in synfuels. Eventually. synfliels production plus domestic oil and gas supply
together satisfy all of domestic demand. Synfuels then become the marginal source of supply, so that die
'4, represents adjustment costs per unit of investment This function is convex in i/K (see Appendix B)and
expresses the notion that installing new capital necessitates a loss of current output, as existing inputs (K,L, E and
Al) are diverted to install new capital.
'The attentionto resourcestock effects distinguishes this model several other general equilibrium energy
environmentalmodels. Many equilibrium models treat the domestic oil&gas industry as involving constant-returns-
to-scale production, disregarding resource stock effects or fixed (scion. In their global energy-environment model,
Manne and Richels (1992) impose stock limits on resources such as oil and gas; however, these limits do not affect
production costs prior to the point where the resource is exhausted.
"That, inputs 3 (oil&gas) and 4 (synfuels) enter additively in the energy aggregation function shown in equation
(9).
"Theworldprice is $24 per bane! in 1990andrises in real terms by $6.50 per decade. See Gaskins and Weyant
(1994).9
costof synfuels productionrather than theworld oil price dictates the domestic price of fuels.'2
C. Household Behavior
Consumption,labor supply, andsaving result from the decisionsofa representative household
maximizingits intenemporal utility, defined on leisure and overall consumption in each period. The uUlity
function is homothetic and leisure and consumption ale weakly separable (see Appendix B). The
householdfaces an intertemporalbudgetconstraint requiring that the present value of the consumption
stream not exceed potential total wealth (nonhuman wealth plus the present value of potential labor income
andnettransfers). In each period, overall consumption of goods and services is allocated across the 17
specific categories of consumption goods or services shown in Table 1. Each of the 17 consumption
goods or services is a composite of a domestically and foreign-produced consumption good (or service)
of that type. Households substitute between domestic and foreign goods to minimize the cost of obtaining
agivencomposite.
D, The Government Sector
The government collects taxes, distributes transfers, and puxhases goods and services (outputs of
the 13 industries). The tax instruments include energy taxes, output taxes, the corporate income tax.
property taxes, sales taxes,and taxeson individual labor andcapitalincome. In the benchmark year.
1990.the governmentdeficit amounts to approximately two patent of ONP. Inthe reference case(or
statusquo) simulation, the debt-C}NPratio is approximately constantovertime. In the policyexperiments.
werequire that real government spending and the path of real government debt follow the same path as
in the reference case. To make the policy changes revenue-neutral, we accompany the tax rate increases
that define the various policies with reductions in other net taxes, either on a lump-sum basis (increased
exogenoustransfers) orthrough reductions in the marginal rates of other taxes.
E.Foreign Trade
Exceptforoil and gas imports,importedintermediateand consumergoods ame imperfect
substitutes for their domestic counterparts.'3 Import prices axe exogenous in foreign currency, but the
domestic-currency price changeswithvariations in the exchange rate. Export demands are modeled as
'%rdetails,see Goulder (1992).
'11n.we adopt theassumption of Armington (1969).to
functions of the foreign price of U.S. exports and the level of foreign income (in foreign currency). The
exchange rate adjusts to balance trade in every period.
F. Modeling PollutionEmissions
Recent extensions of the model enable it to project emissions of eight important pollutants: total
suspended particles (TSP), sulphur oxides (SOX), nitric oxides (NOX), volatile organic compounds
(VOC's). carbon monoxide (CD), lead (Pb). particulate matter (PM1O), and carbon dioxide (CD2).
The key parameters used to project emissions levels (under baseline assumptions or in response
to a change of policy) are emissions factors. These factors are calculated based on detailed U.S. data on
emissions rates for specific industrial processes and fuels.'4
G. Equilibrium and Growth
The solution of the model is a general equilibrium in which supplies and demands balance in all
markets at each period of time. Thus the solution requires that supply equal demand for labor inputs and
for all produced goods15, that firms' demands for lovable funds match the aggregate supply by
households, and that the government's tax revenues equal its spending less the current deficit These
conditions are met through adjustments in output prices, in the market interest rate, and in lump-sum
taxes or rnarginai tax rates."
Economic growth reflects the growth of capital stocks and of potential labor resources. The
growth of capital stocks stems from endogenous saving and investment behavior. Potential labor resourtes
are specified as increasing at an exogenous rate!'
The model includes fuel-based, output-based, and mobile-sourre based eznissJons factors. The flit! -based
emissions factor eJ represents the rate of emissions of pollm I pa unit of input of fuel fused industry k. Fuel-
based emissions factors do not account for all of the emissions of a given poUiitant from a given n- Industrial
emissions over and above timse that can be attributed to given fuels are deemed output-based. The output-based
emissions factor eo1. denotes the ratio of output-related emissions of pollutant! to the quantity of gross output from
industry k. The mobile-source emissions factors em express the ratio of emissions I from a given mobile source
k to the level of use of that son (vehicle). For details on data and methodology, see Gout (1993).
"Since oil and gas synfuels are perfect substitutes, they generate a single supply-demand condition.
"Since agents art forward-looking. equilibrium in each period depends not only on current prices and taxes but
on future magnitudes as well.
1'•fl growth of potential labor services is due to population growth and exogenous Hanod-neuttal (labor-
embodied) techriica] progress. The latter is consistent with a steady state because we assume that technical progress
applies both to die production of goods and the enjoyment of leisure.ii
IV.Optimal EnvironmentalTaxes ina Second-Best Setting: NumericalResults
This section uses the model described in Section III to investigate numerically how second-best
considerationsinfluence optimal rates for environmentallymotivatedtaxes. We compare the numerical
results with optimal rates implied by the Pigovian formula and by the analytical model of Section U.
A. The Simulations
Wefocusonthepolicyofacazbontax. Thisisataxonfossifuels—oil.cnideoil.naturalgas,
and syrthiels --inproportion to their carbon content. Since carbon dioxide (C02) emissions generally are
proportional to the carbon content of these fuels", a tax based on carbon content is effectively a tax on
CO2 emissions.t9
We compare results under a carbon tax with results from a reference case or baseline simulation.
In the reference case, all tax rates and other policy variables are maintained at the benchmark (1990)
values.Inthe longrun,the economy reaches a steady state: all quantities increase at a rate of two
percent(governed by the exogenous growthrateof effective labor), while relative prices are constant
Two features of the model prevent balancedgrowth in the short and medium run. First, thedepletion of
oiland gas reserves causesunitcosts of domesticoil andgas supplytorise. In addition, as indicated in
theprevious section,the real prices of imported oil and gas increase in real terms. These features reduce
overtime the share of oil and gasconsumptionrelative to overall consumption.As indicated in Figure
1, rising costs of domestic oil and gas productionleadto diminishing output of domestic oil and gas, while
rising importpriceseventually cause synfuels to replace conventional fuels.
B. Marginal Costs and Benefits from Emissions Reductions
Figure 2a shows the marginal welfare costs of CO2 emissions reductions. The emissions
reductions are achieved through carbon taxes of different magnitudes. The marginal costs are obtained
by dividing the change In welfare costs (as measured by the equivalent variation) by the change in
emissions over successive increments to carton taxes. The marginal costs we calculated for two
alternative uses of therevenues: namely, additionallump-sum transfers and reductions in the marginal
"Theefficiencyofthe combustion process canaffect somewhat the ratio of carbon dioxide emissions to the
carbon content of a given fuel. Howev&, this accounts for only slight variations in this ratio.
"Atmospheric CO2 is considered a rincipal anthropogenic contributor to the greenhouse effect The carbon tax
thus has the potential to reduce the rate of greenhouse warming by curtailing CQ emissions and slowing the rate
of increase in atmospheric CO2 concentrations.12
razesof the personai income tax. The horizontal axis in the figure is the pezeentage reduction in CO2
emissions front the baseline path. Obviously, a given tax generates different percentage reductions at
different limes: we average' these reductionsby firsttaking the present value of the reductions (over an
infinite time horizon). We then convert this number into the annual emissions reduction which, if
increased every year at the steady-state rare of growth, yields the same present value.20 Figure 2b shows
the carbon tax rates necessary to achieve given emissions reductions.2t22 Seven! findings emerge from
the figures. First, marginal welfarecostsrise with increases in carbon tax rates. This reflects rising costs
of carbon abatement. Second. the marginal welfare cost curve is lower in the case of personal income tax
replacement: using the revenues to cut personal income tax razes decreases the distortionary costs of the
income tax, thereby lowering the cost of this revenue-neutral policy relative to the alternative policy with
lump-sum replacement.
Third. emissions reductions from the carbon tax entail positive marginal costs —evenwhen carbon
tax revenues are returned to the economy through cuts in marginal rates of the personal income tax. This
indicates that, at the margin, a carbon tax is more costly than the personal tax it replaces. This result is
consistent with the analysis of Section II. Further experiments with the numerical model consistently yield
this outcorneY
Fourth, the marginal welfare cost curves in Figure 2a intersect the horizontal axis at a positive
value.In other words, incremental carbon taxes (or incremental emissions reductions) involve
non-incrementaj costs. This result contrasts with what one would obtain from a traditional Pigovian tax
analysis, which implicitly assumes an economy without any pre-existing taxes. The Pigovian analysis
20The approach is as follows. Let LE represent the present value of emissions reductions over the infinite
horizon, where reductions are discounted at the household's real after-tax rare of return. Then the annualized
reduction isgivenbyEEfr-g)i(i+r), whereristhe long-nm real after-tax 'interest rate and g is the long-run real
growth rate.
LI environmental damages axe related to concentrations, rather than emissions, it will generally be preferable
to have rising, rather than constant, carbon tax rates. On this see Peck and Teisberg (1992).
22th fact we obtain two relationships betw carbon ' andemissions reductions: one in the case of lump-
sum replacement and one in the case of personal tax replacement But the two we so imiInr they axe virtually
indssnnguubable when plotted. The relationships differ (albeit slightly) because the method of revenue replacement
has a slight influence on emissions. A given carbon tax rare implies slightly larger emissions reductions when
revenue replacement is lump sum (because aggregate income and output fall mat).
1n Goulder (1994), the numerical model of this paper is employed an examine the sources of the excess cost
a carbon tax over personal or ccrporate income taxes. That study identifies the carbon tax's focus on inteunediaxe
Inlsts as a key determinant of its excess costs, thus reinforcing the analytical results from Section 11 of the present
paper.13
asserts that the marginal welfare cost from an environmental tax is equal to the tax rate; hence, the
marginal cost approaches zero as the tax rate becomes small. Our finding that marginal welfare costs axe
non-zero for infinitesmal carbon tax rates reflects the presence of other tax distortions. We rewn to this
issue below.
C.Comparing the Pigoviari Prescription withResults from the Analytical and Simulation Models
Animportant result from Figure2is thatunder both forms of revenue replacement, the optimal
rate for the environmental tax differs substantially from the rate that wouldprescribedbythePigovian
principle. Suppose, for example, that the marginal environmental benefits from reductions in CC)2 were
equal to $75? The Pigovian principle would support a carbon tax of the same value. Our analysis
indicates, however. that in the presence of distortionaxy taxation, such a tax is too high under either form
of revenue replacement: the marginal welfare costs exceed the marginal benefits. With revenues used
to cut personal tax rates, the optimal tax is about $48 per ton. The optimal tax is even lower (about $13
perton) whenrevenuesaxe replaced through lump-sum payments. In fact, under lump-sum replacement,
it is never efficiency-improving to introduce a (non-negative) carbon tax If marginal benefits axe below
$55 per ton!
Further comparisons of implied optimal tax rates are offered in Table 2. The first column of this
table indicates alternative possible values for the marginal environmental damages from CO2 emissions.
The other columns contain the optimal carbon tax rates coxtesponding to these environmental damages.
The third column of Table 2 includes optimal rates implied by the analytical model. That model
indicates that the optimal environmental tax raze is —tothe marginal environmental benefits from
emissions reduction (or marginal damages from emissions) divided by the marginal cost of public funds
Cii). It presumes a world in which other (distonionary) taxes are set optimally. This assumption differs
from the realistic benchmark conditions of the economy to which the numerical model applies;
nevertheless, it is instructive to observe the "optimal" rate implied by the analytical model for the U.S.
economy. Simulation experiments with the numerical model indicate that the marginal cost of public
uTo facilitate the discussion of optimal taxes, we drastically simplify the time dimension. We disregard dynamic
issues such as changes duough time inbenefitsand eos. and dynamic chokes such as optimal changes through time
in tax rates. Time aggregation makes it easier to isolate key relationships that should continue to hold when dynamic
elements are given fuller consideration.14
fundsis approximatelyl.l2.Suppose once again that the marginal environmental benefit from
reductions in CO2 has a value of $75.Inthat case, the analytical model calls for a carbon tax of about
$67 ($7511.12) if the entire tax system is optimaL2'
The fourth and fifth columns of Table 2 show the optimal values generated by the simulation
model. These optimal values are the lax rates that equate marginal costs and benefits from emissions
reductions, using the information shown in Figure 2.
Importantly, both the analytical and numerical models yield optimal tax rates dramatically lower
than those impliedby thePigovian principle. The explanation for these differences was provided in
Section II. In a second-best setting, a given environmental tax generates larger non-environmental costs
than it would in the absence of other, distortionary taxes: environmental taxes compound the distortions
that existing factor taxes generate. Hence, the optimal environmental tax Is lower than the rate implied
by the Pigovian principle.
The numerical model yields optimal rates even lower than those endorsed by the analytical model.
The complexity of the numerical model makes it difficult to identify the cause of this difference.
However, an important potential sowte is the nature of the benchmark. The analytical model's fonnula
for optimal environmental taxes presumes an economy in which all taxes are set optimally. The numerical
model. in contrast, employs a benchmark which approximates the actual U.S. tax system in 1990. This
benchmark is suboç*imal (in an efficiency sense) because the marginal efficiency costs of various taxes
are not equal. It is worthwhile exploring the extent to which numerical simulations of the carbon tax
under more efficient benchmark conditions would involve lower marginal costs of given emissions
reductions and thus generate optimal carbon taxes closer to those predicted by the analytical model.
We do this by constructing a counterfactual bni.rhmark involving an "improved" initial
configuration of taxes, and then deriving the optimal carbon tax in this counterfactual setting. Specifically.
we create a counterfactuaJ benchmark that is optimal according to the principles inherent in the analytical
model. The optimized benchmark involves two changes relative to the original benchmaxlc (1) taxes on
intermediate inputs, industry outputs, and consumer goods are eliminated, and (2) marginal tax rates on
We calculate the marginal cost of public funds by scaling up the exogenous path of government spending by
a factor slightly greater than 1 (namely, 1.005), and calculating the weLre impact when this spending increase is
financed througb increased personal income taxes, The MCPFisequal to EV/PV(6Q), where EV is the welfrre
change (as measured bythe equivalentvariation) and PV(g%O) is the pesent value of the change in government
spending.
'PezhaPs more PreciselY, this is the optimal tax rate that arises when the analytical model's optimal tax nile is
applied using the marginal cost of public funds frmr the nwnthcal model.15
capital and labor axe adjusted so that the marginal welfare cost per dollar axe the same for each tax. Thus,
under the optimized benchmark, all existing taxes involve the same marginal excess burden per dollar of
revenue($0.22).
Figure 2 and Table2 includeresults from a carbontaxthat is imposed on this optimized
benchmark. Figure 2ashows that under thiscounterfactual scenario the marginal welfare costs of given
emissionsreductionsaxesignificantlylower thanunderthe realistic case.Conespondingly. In Table 2 the
optimal carbon tax associatedwithgivenmarginalenvironmental damagesis higher thanthe optimal tax
arising inthe realistic benchmark case.Bycomparingtheresults in the third and last columns of Table
2.we find that under the optimized benchmark the simulationmodelyields optimal tax rates quite close
to those endorsed by the analyticalmodel. This indicatesthat mostofthedifferencesbetween the
analyticalandsimulationmodel results are due to the"suboptimal"natureoftheordinary benchmarkfor
the simulation model.2'
D. Sensitivity Analysis
Table 3indicatesthe sensitivity of optimal tax rates to key parameters. These simulationsinvolve
changesrelative to the realistic (as opposed to optimized) benchmark. The table reports results based on
a posited value of $75/ton for the marginal environmental benefits from the carbon tax. All results in the
table are for simulations in which carbon tax revenues are returned to the economy through reductions in
personal income Lax rates.
The general result from Table 3isthat, under the range of parameter values considered, the
analytical and numerical models call for optimal tax rates below the Pigovian optimum. The analytical
optimum is below the Pigovian optimum because the MCPF consistently exceeds unity. The numerical
optimum is always below the analytical optimum; as discussed previously, this seems to reflect the
suboptimal nature of the benchmark.
Toconsiderthesignificanceof pre-existing tax rates (heading 2), we reduce orincrease all
marginal tax rates for pre-existing tax rates by 50peicenLThe MCPF approaches unity asthepie-existing
270ne could argue that in fact the current tax system is less imperfect than suggested by the non-zero intertept
of the middle line inFigw'eaTheanalytical model i,vlirsthatthe optimal second-best tax system has zero
taxes on intermediate goods and on clean consumer goods. However, in the real world non-zero taxes on
intermediate goods —cleanconsumer goods need not ccxistiuzte departures from optimality. To the extent that
certain consumer good taxes are in fact user fees or we aimed at internalizing other environmental externalities, the
additional marginalwelfare coststhey generate may be justified by the benefits of the specific goods, services, or
environmentalimprovementsthey finance. Becausethe simulationmodel does not capture these benefits, it may
overstate themarginal welfarecostsof carbon emissions reductions.16
taxrates are reduced; accordingly, the optimal tax rates from the analytical and simulationmodels
approach the Pigovian rate of $75/ton.
The inrertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption regulates the sensitivity of household
savings to the after-tax return- Larger values for this elasticity raise the MCPF (and thus decrease the
optimal tax from the analytical model). The optimal tax from the simulation model is also lower in this
case, implying that the revenue-neutral carbon tax package exacerbates distortions of the capital market,
despite the fact that its revenuesase returned(in part) through reductions in capital income taxes.
The uncompensated elasticity of laborsupply regulatesthe potential fordistortionsin labor
markets. A higher value for this elasticity raises the MCPF (and reduces the optimal tax from the
analytical model). However, a higher elasticity of labor supply implies a higher optimal tax from the
numerical model. Hence, the revenue-neutral combination of a carbon tax and a personal tax cut tends
to reduce labor market distortions. This suggests that the carbon tax primarily distorts the inleilemporal
margin while the personal tax (for which labor income contributes 70 peivent of the revenues) distorts
mainly the labor-leisure margin.
Higher values for energy substitution elasticities enlarge the potential for distortions in energy
markets. With higher elasticities the MCPF is higher and the analytical optimum is lower. The numerical
model's optimum is also lower in this case. The revenue-neutral combination of carbon tax and peisonai
tax cut thus exacerbates inefficiencies (abstracting from environmental benefits) in energy markets.
V.Conclusions
'ntis paper has employed analytical and numerical models to examine the general equilibrium
interactions between environmentally motivated taxes and distortlonaiy taxes. Our results indicate that
accounting for pre-existing taxes yields optimal tax rates considerably below the rates suggested by the
Pigovian principle. This may seem to contradict the notion, expressed by several authors, that optimal
tax rates can be higherifenvironmental tax revenues are returned to the economy through cuts in
distortionary taxes, rather than in lump-sum fashion. In fact, there is no contradiction here: different
reference points apply. We too find that for given marginal environmental benefits) the optimal tax is
higher with revenue replacement through cuts in distortionary taxes than with replacement through
increased lump-sum transfers (larger lump-sum tax reductions). But we also find that the optimal rate
under either type of revenue replacement is considerably lower in a second-best economy compared with
the result for the same type of revenue replacement in an economy without distonionary taxes.
En this connection, estimates of optimal carbon taxes in integrated climate-economy models (e.g.,17
Nordhaus[1993)21. and Peckand Teisberg [1992]) are biasedupward.For example, Norxihaus (1993)
considershow recycling carbon tax revenues through cuts in distortionaxy taxes raises the optimal carbon
tax. When revenues fromthe carbon tax anreturned in lump-sum fashion, the optimal tax rate forthe
first decadeisabout$5per ton;theoptimal rate rises to $59 per ton when revenues axe devoted to
reducing distortioriary taxes. Importantly, that study does not consider how pm-existing taxes increase
thegross costs of the carbon tax itselfQxfore the revenues axe recycled). While the Nordhaus study
accountsfor the efficiency gains connected with the reduction(throughrecycling) of initial distortionazy
taxes, itdoes notconsider the efficiency costsstemmingfrom the Interactions betweenremaining
distortionaxytaxes and the newly imposed carbon tax. The analytical and simulation models in this paper
indicate that the costs associated with (remaining) pre-existing distortions axe greater than the benefits from
reductions in distortionary taxes made possible by the carbon tax revenues. Hence, pm-existing taxes
reducetheoptimal tax rate.
Theseresults provide some guidelinesonthe setting of envixonmentaltaxes.At the same time,
itshould be emphasizedthatinmanycUtumstances a key Ingredientinthe optimal tax formulation--the
marginalenvironmental benefits --is veryuncertain. Further researththat narrowstheuncertaintybands
willbe of great value to policy analysts.
'Nordhaus has pioneered the integration of (environmental) benefits and (non-environmental) costs in simulation
modeling of carbon taxes.18
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Substituting (A.2) into the first first-order condition in (A. 1), we find the producer wage in terms of I.
and:,.:





To find the optimal tax rates, we substitute (A.2) into (4) to eliminate land 1. Maximizing with
respect to tL' we find the following first-order condition (after dividing throughby-wN).
+ i [y + (tLwflxflr)_] + NuESND_+UFflr$!:_.=O (A.5)





A-iSubstitution of (A.6) and (A.7) into (AS) yields
= j.s (tpt,)__ + (AS)
L 3w,,t3wj















(A.lO) and(A.l I) together imply ç = 0andt,= tfl. With(A.7), this implies(5), wherei= Wu..






(A.12) and (A. 13) are the familiar Ramseyequationsin which the term 'Disreplaced by the distortionaiy
partofthe tax onpollutingconsumption.a'1f= . Thenon-distortionary part is given by(A.6),
which can be written as (6) by using the definition of (/u.).





TableAl indicates thenested production structure. In each industry i, gross output A is produced using
inputs of labor (Ucapital (K) , an energycomposite(E,) and a materials composite (A). The production
functionhas the following form:
I) = j [ g1,(LK,) . g24(E,M,) j — 4,(1/K1)I,
The functions ), g,1, and g1 are CES. Hence the function f can be written as:
2) f(g,, g,) y,[a,gr. (I - a)? ]UPr
wheretheindustry subscript has been suppressed and where a,, and p, are parameters. The parameter p is
related too,theelasticityofsubstitutionbetween g, and g2: p (o - l)/a. Analogous expressionsapply for
thefunctionsg, and g. -
The second terminequation (1) represents the loss of output associated with installing new capital (or
dismantlingexisting capital). Per-unit adjustmentcosts, • aregiven by:
3) 4(1/K)(t/2) (1/K —
1/K
where I represents gross investment (purchases of new capital goods) and E and 6 are parameters. The
parameter 6 denotes the rate of economic depreciation of the capital stock.
The energy composite (E,) in equation (I) is a CES function of the specific energy




'A more comprehensive description of the suucture of the model is in Goulder (1992). Detailed documentation
of the data and parameters for the model is provided in Cnzz and Goulder (1992).
A-)Table Al: NestedProductiocStructure





= E%ED1 EF) I = I5
= M%MD1MF) 1=1 7
Note: All functions are CES in form except for j'J/K), which
is quadratic in 1/K.
Table A2; Nested Utility Structure
Function: Functional Eonn:
U,(CL.C C.,...) constant intertemporal elasticity of substitution
C,(C,,1,) CES
C,(C,,,..., C.,,.., C,,,) Cobb-Douglas
C (CD,CF,) CES
Key:
LI, = intertemporal utility evaluated from period:
C, = fill consumption in period a
C, = overall goods consumption in period a
= leisureinperiod a
= consumption of composite consumer good i in period .i
CD, = consumption of domestically produced consumer good i in periods
CF,, = consumption of foreign produced consumer good i in period a






5 Processed natural gas
Oil&gas and synthetic fuels combine as one input in the energy composite, reflecting the fact that these fuels are
treated as perfect substitutes in production.1
Similarly, the materials composite (M) in equation (I) is a CBS ftmction of the specific
materials products of the 7 non-energy industries:
5a) 41 = 41(41,, 44,..., 41,)
5b) yu
where = IThe subscripts to M in equations (5a) and (Sb) correspond to materials (non-energy)
industries as follows:
Subscript Materials Industry
Agriculture and mining (except coal mining)
Construction
3 Metals and machinery
4 Motor vehicles
5 Miscellaneous manufacturing
6 Services (except housing services)
7 Housing services
Theelements and M2(/=1,.7) inthe£and U fUnctionsarethemselvesCFS
compositesofdomesticallyproducedand foreign made inputs:
6) E =YEJ{aL,w) +(I— a1)RF], J = I 5
7) =TM) [CM, MD7° + (1
—
ctMJ)MF;I, j — I,.,7
2E., denotes the total quantity (in energy-equivalent units) of oil&gas plus synfisels:
1,£,
A—Swhere EDJ and E1denotedomestic and foreign energy inputs of type j, and MD1andM)5 denote domestic
and foreign materials inputsoftype j -
b. Endogeneity ofin the OiI&Gas Production Function
In industries other than oil&gas, the element in the production function is panmetric In the oil&gas
industry, is a decreasing function of cumulative oil&gas extraction:
8) = eEl — (Z,IZ)"I
where e, and e2 are parameters, Z, represents cumulative extraction as of the beginning of period :. and Z
is the original estimated total stock of recoverable reserves of oil&gas (as estimated from the benchmark year). The
following equation of motion specifies the evolution of Z,:
9) Z,1 =Z,-X,
Equation (8) implies that the production function for oil and gas shifts downward as cumulative oil&gas extraction
increases. This addresses the fact that as reserves are depleted, remaining reserves become more difficult to extract
and require more inputs per unit of extraction.
2. Behavior or Firms
In each industry, managers of finns are assumed to serve stockbolders in aiming to maximize the value of
the finn. The objective of farm-value maximization determines finns' choices of input quantities and investment
levels in each period of time.
The value of the finn can be expressed in terms of dividends and new share issues, which in turn depend
on profits in each period. The firm's profits during a given period are given by:
10)x = (I - a) [pX-w(l + t)L - EMCOST-IDEBT - TPROP] + t(DEPL + DEPR)
where r, is the tax rate on profits. p is the output price net of output taxes. w is the wage rate net of indirect
labor taxes, TL is rate of the indirect tax on labor, EMCOSTisthe cost to the finn of energy and materials inputs.
i is the gross-of-tax interest rate paid by the finn, DEBT is the firm's current debt, TPROP is property tax
payments, DEPL is the current gross depletion allowance, and DEPR is the current gross depreciation allowance.
TPROP equals r, p, ,, K. where r,, is the property tax tate, p is the purchase price of a unit of new capital,
and s is the time period. Current depletion allowances, DEPt , are a constant fraction fi of the value of cturent
extraction: DEPL = flpX. Current depreciation allowances, DEPR , can be expressed as &rxr. where Kr is
A-6the depreciablecapitalstock basis and o is the depreciation rate applied for tax purposes.'







where the subscripts for energy and materials correspond to industries as indicated above; and where r and TM
denote the tax rates applying to the firm's use of intermediate inputs, and PLOJ and PE.FJ (p and p) are the
pre-tax prices of domestic and foreign energy (materials) inputs of type j .'
The following accounting or cash-flow identity links the finn's sources and uses of revenues:
12) itBK VN = DIV + JEXP
Theleft-hand side is the firm's source of revenues: profits, new debt issue (BK) ,and new share issues (flQ
The uses of revenues on the rigbt-hand side are investment expenditure (tEXT) and dividend payments (Dlv)
Negativeshare issues are equivalent to share repurchases, and represent a use rather than source of revenue.
Firms pay dividends equal to a constant fraction, a, of profits net of economic depreciation, and maintain
debt equal to a constant fraction, 0 . of the value of the existing capital stock. Thus:
13) DIP', = a [it, 4 — p,,1)K — &PKIK,]
14) BN,DEBT,,1 - DEBT, b(p1K,-
Investment expenditure is expressed by:
15) XP, (I —
where r is the investment tax credit rate. Of the elements in equation (12) , new share issues. kIV, are the
'For convenience, we assume that the accelerated depreciation schedule can be approximatcd by a schedule
involving constant exponential tax depreciation.
4To simplify the exposition, we have not included in equations (10) and (Ii) subscripts identifying the given
industry for which profits or input costs are calculated. It may be noted that the intennediate good taxes, r, and
• may differ across industries using a particular good as well as across intermediate goods.
In equation (11), for j = 2 the expression p (I + i) E is shod-hand for p (I + rJ E ÷ p, (I
+ rI E, where "og" refers to oit and gas and "sf' refers to synfliels. Since oil&gas and synfliels are perfect
substitutes, it is always the case that gross-of-tax costs of these fuels to the firm are the same: that is, ji (I + T0)
p4 (1 + ij. However, when r,, $ 14, the net-of-tax prices p,,, and p4 will differ.
A—7residual, making up the difference between w + fiNandDIV+IEXP.'
Arbitrage possibilities compel the firm to offer its stockholders a rate of return comparable to the rate of
interest on alternative assets.
16) (I — r) DIV,.(I— r,)(V,1—V
—YN,)=(I
—;) iV5
Theparameters r, ,,-,and r are the personal tax rates on dividend income (equity), capital gains, and interest
income (bonds), respectively. The return to stockholders consists of the current after-tax dividend plus the after-tax
capital gain (accrued or realized) on the equity value (9 of the fum net of the value of new share issues. This
return must be comparable to the after-tax return from an investment of the same value at the market rate of interest,
The firm's decision problem is completed by the equation of motion for the capital stock:
17) K,.1 =(I —8)K,.J,
Capital is augmented by net investment. Cumulative extraction is augmented by the level of current output (or
extraction). In the oil&gas industry, the equation of motion (9) also applies.
B. Household Behavior
Consumption, labor supply, and saving result from the decisions of an inftnitely-lived representative
household maximizing its intertemporal utility with perfect foresight. The nested structure of the household's utility
function is indicated in Table A2. In year I the household chooses a path of"full consumption" C to maximize
18) L/, = E (I +
0
a-I
where o is the subjective rate of time preference and a is the interteinporal elasticity of substitution in hill
consumption. C is a CES composite of conswnption of goods and services C and leisure e
19) C,' [CSV •at," J
is the elasticity of substitution between goods and leisure; a. is an intensity parameter for leisure.
The variable C in (25) is a Cobb-Douglas aggregate of 17 composite consumer goods:
17
20) C,=flC7; 1=1
wherethe a<,(i= I Il) are parameters. The 17 types of consumer goods identified in the model are shown
'For a discussion of alternative specifications, see Poterba and Summers (1985).
A-Bin Table 2 of the main text.
Consumer goods are produced domesticallyandabroad. Each composite consumer good C, I = I 17,
is a CES aggregate of a domestic and foreign consumer good of a given type:
21) C=[a,cD + (1 —
In the above equation. CDandCFdenotethe household's consumption of domestically produced and foreign
made consumer good of a given type at a given point in time. For simplicity, we have omitted subscripts designating
the type of consumer good and the time period.
The household maximizes utility subject to the intertemporal budget constraint given by the following
condition governing the change in financial wealth, WK
22) WK,,-WK,
=i,WK,YL,+UT,-p,C,
Inthe above equation, ? is the average after-tax return on the household's portfolio of financial capital, ILis
after-tax labor income, CIT is transfer income, and p is the price index representing the cost to the household of
a unit of the consumption composite, e
C. Government Behavior
A single government sector approximates government activities at all levels — federal, state, and local. The
main activities of the government sector are purchasing goods and services (both non-durable and durable), to
transferring incomes, and to raising revenue through taxes or bond issue.
I. Components orGovernmentExpenditure
Government expenditure, U , divides into nominal purchases of nondurable goods and services (UP)
nominalgovernment investment (Gfl, and nominal transfers (07):
23) G,=GP,+Gl,÷GT
Inthe reference case, the paths of realUP, U!, andUTallare specified as growing at the steady-state
real growth rate, g. In simulating policy changes we fix the paths of UP,U!,and UTsothat the paths of real
government purchases, investment and transfers are the same as in corresponding years of the reference case. Thus,
the expenditure side of the government ledge. is largely kept unchanged across simulations. This procedure is
expressed by:
(24a) GP' / Pw.c = GP?/ Pr.,
(24b) 01 / p, = Gl/ Pi'
A—9(24c) GTI / p1, = GTf PT,
The superscripts P and /? denote policy change and reference case magnitudes, while Prp p;,1 and Pr;r are
price indices for GP . GI and fiT. The price index for government investment, Pa,. is the purchase price of the
representative capital good. The price index for transfers, PUT' is the consumer price index. The index for
government purchases. Pr;P' is defined below.
2. Allocation of Government Purchases
GP divides into purchases of particular outputs olthe I) domestic industries according to tixed expenditure
shares:
25) aJ3P = GPX,p, II/3
GPX and p are the quantity demanded and price of output from industry I . and a11 is the corresponding




A. Elasticities of Substitution in Production
Parameter: a,, a, a a. a,
Substitution E corn- M corn- dom-foreign
margin: L-K E-M ponents ponents inputs
Producina Industry:
I. Agric. & Non-coal 0.7 0.68 0.7 1.45 0.6 2.31
Mining
2. Coal Mining 0.7 0.80 0.7 1.0$ 0.6 1.14
3. Oil & Gas Extraction 0.7 0.82 0.7 l.04 0.6 (infinite)
4. Synthetic Fuels 0.7 0.82 0.7 1.04 0.6 (not traded)
5. Petroleum Refining 0.7 0.74 0.7 1.04 0.6 2.21
6. Electric Utilities 0.7 0.81 0.7 0.97 0.6 1.0
7. Gas Utilities 0.7 0.96 0.7 1.04 0.6 1.0
8. Construction 0.7 0.95 0.7 1.04 0.6 1.0
A—b9. Metals & Machinery 0.7 0.91 0.7 1.21 0.6
12. Services (except
housing)









Note: This function is parameterized so that y approaches 0 as
of 2 is 450 billion bagels (about 100 times the 1990 production
equivalents.) 2 is based on estimates from Masters eta!. (1987).
be protitable before reserves are depleted: the values of c1 and c1
investment becomes zero in the year 203 I.
C. Utility Function Parameters
2 approaches 1 (see equation (8)). The value
of oil and gas, where gas is measured in barrel-
Investment in new oil and gas capital ceases to
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1. Agriculture andNon-Coal Mining
2. Coal Mining






9. Metals and Machinery
10. Motor Vehicles
II. Miscellaneous Manufacturing










8. Clothing and Jewelry
9. Transportation
10. Motor Vehicles
11. Services (except financial)
12. Financial Services
13. Recreation, Reading. & Misc.
14. Nondurable, Non-Food Household
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25 25 22 0 7 17
50 50 45 0 27 41
75 75 67 13 48 64
100 100 89 31 68 85Table 3: Sensitivity Analysis'
Optimum Optimum
Impliedby from
MCPF Numerical ModelSimulation Model
1. Central Case 1.121 67 48
2. Marginal Rates for
he-existing Taxes
--lowered50% 1.036 72 64




--low(.33) 1.102 68 52
--high(.66) 1.146 65 45
4. Uncompensated Elasticity
of Labor Supply3
--low(-0.03) 1.109 68 44
--high(0.16) 1.149 65 54
5. Energy Substitution Elasticities4
--loweredby 50% 1.107 68 50
--raisedby 50% 1.173 64 44
'F4arg environmental benefits are assumed to be SiMon. Results icr the numerical model are fimn simulations
of a carbon tax with revenue-reserving reductions in marginal rates of the prisons! izome mx.
'Central case value is 0.5.
'These simulations involve changes in u. the goods-leisure elasticity of substitution. The cenual case value of U is
0.69, implying an uncompensazed labor supply elasticity of 0.06.is 0.64 and 0.74 in the low and high elasticity
cases. The compensated elasticities in the low, central and high cases are 0.45. 032. and 0.63. respectively.
1n die low Qtigh) elasticity simulation, the elasticity of substitution between composite energy (t) and composite
materials (?1) is lowered (raised) in all industies by 50 percent.